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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
 
It is a fairly commonly held opinion that the act of disregarding or ”overriding” treaties in 
favor of domestic law provisions run the risk of severely threatening internationally 
established networks of bilateral and multilateral agreements.
1
 Pacta sunt servanda is a 
founding principle of international law, inherent in the Vienna Convention, and widely 
recognized as a reflection of customary international law.
2
 Meanwhile, it is a well known fact 
that tax treaties run the risk of being abused by tax payers in order to circumvent legislation 
and thereby achieve tax advantages that were not intended by the legislator. Thus, a highly 
relevant and extensively discussed issue in contemporary international tax law is the 
relationship between domestic anti-avoidance legislation and tax treaty commitments, and 
particularly, whether domestic anti-avoidance legislation can be applied in order to deny 
treaty benefits.
3
 The referred discussion is signified by great controversy where scholars place 
their opinions in a widely stretched spectrum ranging from opposition to affirmation, 
supported by varying argumentation and points of concern. 
At present day, Sweden is a contracting part in over 80 bilateral double tax treaties and is 
there by one of the countries that have entered into most tax treaty relations in the world.
4
 In 
March 2012 the Supreme Administrative Court of Sweden (HFD) delivered its judgment on 
the case HFD 2012 ref. 20,
 5
 concerning the tax treatment of liquidation payment from a 
Peruvian company to a fully liable tax payer in Sweden. At the time for the relevant 
transactions, a tax treaty between Sweden and Peru provided for source taxation alongside full 
exemption for the other contracting state.
6
 The distribution payment at hand, being a result of 
several transactions and formations of companies during a short period of time, would 
according to the Swedish tax authorities be exempt from treaty benefits by means of the 
Swedish law on tax avoidance (the GAAR). The significance of the referred case was, 
                                                          
1
 Avi-Yonah, R.S., ‘Tax traty overrides: a qualified defence of U.S practice’ in Maisto, G. (Series Edt.), Tax treaties 
and domestic law,  Amsterdam: IBFD, 2006, P.65. Wouters, J. & Vidal, M., ‘The international perspective’ in 
Ibid., P.13-35. OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, report on tax treaty overrides, Paris, 1989. 
22
 Wouters, J. & Vidal, M.,‘ The international perspective’ in Maisto, G. (Series Edt.), Tax treaties and domestic 
law, Amsterdam: IBFD, 2006,  P.14. 
3
 Dahlberg, M., Internationell beskattning, Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2012, P. 251 
4
 Lodin, S.O, Lindencrona, G., Meltz, P., Silfverberg, C., Simon-Almendal T. Inkomstskatt- En läro- och handbook 
I skatterätt, Part 2, Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2011, P. 615 
5
 HFD 2012 ref. 20 
6
 SFS 1968:745 
5 
 
however, not the result and final judgment, which was reached through ordinary treaty 
interpretation resulting in that Sweden‟s right to tax was not restricted. More significant, 
though, was an introductory observation made by the Court, establishing that the treaty with 
Peru did not preclude the application of Swedish domestic anti-avoidance legislation. 
Additionally, the Court found no facts implying that the mutual expectations of the parties had 
been that domestic anti-avoidance rules should not be applicable to abusive applications of the 
treaty. Thus, the Court found there to be no principal hindrance of testing the current scenario 
against the Swedish law on tax avoidance.
 7
 Yet, as the case was resolved before any 
application of domestic anti-avoidance rules came into question, the Court‟s statement merely 
holds the status of an obiter dicta (an observation not essential for the final result). 
Nevertheless, it has been stated that this particular observation hold a stronger legal value than 
what normally can be ascribed to an obiter dicta, predominantly due to the clear and articulate 
expression of the Court‟s standpoint on the matter.8 
1.2 Purpose 
 
With respect to extensive national and international doctrinal debate dedicated to the 
relationship between domestic anti-avoidance legislation and tax treaty obligations, 
commonly encompassing a good deal of criticism towards the act of disregarding treaties by 
reference to domestic law provisions, it is of interest not only to put the standpoint of the 
Swedish Supreme Administrative Court into a doctrinal framework but an international ditto. 
The interest in so doing would derive from a possibility of utilizing an even wider range of 
opinions and concerns, relevant not only in a Swedish context, but on an international level. 
The purpose and ambition of the present paper is therefore to put Swedish law, as expressed 
obiter dictum in HFD 2012 ref. 20, into an international perspective. This will be done by 
drawing internationally relevant conclusions on advantages and disadvantages in the Court‟s 
standpoint by reference to supportive as well as opposing pieces of argumentation derived 
from international doctrinal debate.  
1.3 Method and Materials 
 
The present study will initially apply a traditional legal method, utilizing case law and other 
legal material in order to clarify the present legal situation in Sweden regarding the 
                                                          
7
 HFD 2012 ref. 20. 
8
 Hilling, M., ’HFDs Perudomar’, Skattenytt, 2012,P. 591. 
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relationship between tax treaties and domestic anti-avoidance legislation.
9
 This will be 
necessary in order to subsequently put the present legal situation, envisaged by the 
observation made in HFD 2012 ref. 20, into an international perspective. Part of the initial 
task of the paper will, further, be to identify key aspects of the observation made obiter 
dictum in the referred judgment of HFD 2012 ref. 20. A selection of aspects will be made out 
of questions arising a propos the Court‟s observation with regard to doctrinal debate. These 
aspects will then form the basis onto which doctrinal opinions will be applied as templates for 
support and contradictions to appear. Thus, in drawing conclusions on advantages and 
disadvantages in the Court‟s standpoint, international doctrine will serve as important 
parameters.  
The extensive range of material dedicated to the subject of domestic law in relation to tax 
treaties have the potential of providing a rich and multifaceted basis for analysis, yet, this will 
also create difficulties in terms of choice of material. The choice of material in terms of 
doctrinal opinions will take place with regard to both prominence in the field as well as their 
ability to deliver a diverse outlook on the relevant matter. In order to draw objective 
conclusions it will be of utter importance to keep a glance on several possible viewpoints at 
all times. Thus, the present paper does not make any attempts of providing the “truth” but 
solely to lift possible conclusions and perspectives on the standpoint taken by the Swedish 
Supreme Administrative Court regarding applicability of domestic anti-avoidance rules in 
relation to double tax treaties. 
1.4 Delimitation 
 
The observation subject to analysis in the present paper has habitually been analyzed in a 
context of previous settled Supreme Administrative Court judgments, especially regarding 
applicability of the Swedish CFC-rules in relation to double tax treaties.
10
  Additionally, the 
cases concerning CFC-rules
11
 have on their own been subject to immense scrutiny.
12
 The 
present paper will not aim at repeating conclusions drawn from such studies as the matter has 
already been extensively explored. However, it must be acknowledged that Court opinions 
                                                          
9
 A discussion on the legal method is provided by for example: Peczenik, A., ’Juridikens allmänna läror’, Svensk 
Juristtidning, 2005:3, P. 249 ff. 
10
 See for example Dahlberg, M. Internationell beskattning, Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2012, P. 246 ff.  
11
 RÅ 2008 ref. 24 and RÅ 1996 ref. 84. 
12
 See for example: Mutén, L. ‘Treaty override I regeringsrätten’, Svensk Skattetidning, 2008, P.353. Dahlberg, 
M., Internationell beskattning, Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2012, P.246. Grundström, K.J, ’Treaty override – nu även 
i Skatterättsnämnden’, Skattenytt 2010, P.159-166. 
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and case law do not evolve in a vacuum alienated from previous judgments and observations. 
Further, it could be argued that the Supreme Administrative Court has provided important 
clarifications on the relationship between domestic legislation and tax treaty obligations in its 
judgment RÅ 2010 ref. 112. However, the Court‟s reasoning in this case concerned the 
relationship between domestic law and tax treaties in general, thus it did not refer to domestic 
anti-avoidance rules or the GAAR in particular. Further, it has been held that even though the 
Court, in RÅ 2010 ref. 112, clarified that treaties should prevail over domestic legislation they 
left ambiguities behind by providing for exceptions to that general rule.
13
 In addition, the 
Court stressed that, despite the general rule of treaties prevailing over domestic law, there 
exists no formal or constitutional hindrance in applying legislation in contradiction to tax 
treaty provisions.
14
  It can therefore be held that the legal situation was still rather unclear up 
until the time for settlement of HFD 2012 ref. 20. Thus, RÅ 2010 ref. 112 would merely help 
describing the context in which the observation in HFD 2012 ref 20 was made, which 
however, is not necessary for fulfilling the purpose of the present study. As HFD 2012 ref. 20 
is the most accurate judgment available and concerns the relationship between the Swedish 
GAAR and tax treaties in particular, focus will rest solely on the observation made by the 
Court in that specific judgment. Doctrinal work and other material used to put this observation 
into perspective will concern anti-avoidance rules in general terms. This would, quite 
naturally, be due to the fact that the Swedish law on tax avoidance is of a general nature. 
Further, analyzed aspects of the observation made in HFD 2012 ref. 20 will be a result of 
subjective selection made by the author by inspiration of doctrinal discussions. There may 
very well be supplementary aspects of the case worthy of observance and assessment; 
however, these will fall outside of the scope of this study. 
1.5 Outline 
 
Chapter two of the paper will be dedicated to some introductory points, necessary for grasping 
the frames of reference in doctrinal debate and the forthcoming analysis. Also, the case of 
HFD 2012 ref. 20 will be presented. Points of interest and concern regarding the observation 
made by the Court will thereafter, in Chapter three, form the basis for analysis in comparison 
to international doctrinal debate. Here, each point of concern will be assessed by first 
reviewing doctrinal debate and subsequently drawing parallels to the observation made in 
                                                          
13
 Dahlberg, M., Internationell beskattning, Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2012, P.248. 
14
 RÅ 2010 ref. 112 
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HFD 2012 ref. 20. Lastly, Chapter four will contain concluding remarks by reference to the 
purpose of the paper. 
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2. BACKGROUND 
 
In order to fully grasp doctrinal reasoning as well as the method used by the Court in the case 
subject for the forthcoming analysis it is relevant to shortly comment on general conditions 
that come into play in the current context. 
2.1 Incorporation and application of DTTs in Sweden 
 
Over all, there are two general ways for countries to commit to international treaty law. Either 
by a monistic or dualistic approach. Monistic states perceive treaty law and domestic law as 
two parts of the same legal system. Dualistic states, on the other hand, view treaty law and 
domestic law as two separate systems with the effect of treaties having to be incorporated into 
the domestic legal system via adaption of specific incorporation laws.
15
 Sweden would ascribe 
to the latter approach which means that treaties come into effect only after laws of their 
incorporation are being passed by the government.
16
 It is then the law of incorporation that 
provides the treaty obligations rather than the actual treaty.
17
  
The method when applying a treaty can further be described as taking place through a process 
of three steps. First, it needs to be established whether the income at hand would normally be 
subject to tax under domestic Swedish legislation. If taxing claims exist under domestic 
legislation it will be necessary to ascribe whether the relevant treaty contains provisions that 
restrict such taxing rights. Here it should be mentioned that, by means of the golden rule, a 
treaty can never extend a state‟s right to tax beyond what is established under domestic law.18 
If it is established that a treaty restricts domestic taxing rights, the third step of the application 
process would consist of applying domestic taxation prospects with regard to the delimitations 
provided by the treaty.
19
 The main issue in terms of application of a double tax treaty, 
however, is perhaps more one of interpretation rather than application. In this sense, the 
Supreme Administrative Court has made some important observations regarding treaty 
                                                          
15
 Dahlberg, M. Interntionell Beskattning, Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2011, P. 235. 
16
 Lodin, S.O et al. Inkomstskatt – en läro- och handbok i skatterätt, Part 2, Lund:Studentlitteratur, 2011, P.656. 
17
 Hultqvist, A., ’Metodfrågor vid konflikt mellan lagar om dubbelbeskattningsavtal och andra 
skattebestämmelser – en argumentationsanalys’, Svensk skattetidning, 2010, P. 520. 
18
 Pelin, L. Internationell skatterätt i ett Svenskt perspektiv, Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2011, p. 97. Lindencrona, G, 
Dubbelbeskattningsavtalsrätt, Stockholm: Juristförlaget, 1994, p. 24. 
19
 Hilling, M. ’HFDs Peru domar’, Skattenytt 2012, P. 585. 
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interpretation and applicable methods.
20
 First, it has been held that in terms of interpreting the 
mutual intentions of the parties, guidance should be derived from Art. 31-33 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)
21
 which provides general directions for treaty 
interpretation. Second, for treaties following the format of the OECD Model Tax Convention 
(MTC), the Court held that it is normally justified to interpret its provisions by reference to 
the Commentary to the Model. This would be due to the fact that the expectations and 
intentions of the parties then can be assumed to resemble the OECD recommendations. If the 
definition of a treaty provision should not be found by guidance of the commentary and not 
stand clear from the context or other circumstances, the interpretation article 3.2 of the MTC 
provides that recourse can be taken to the definition provided by domestic legislation.
22
 Most 
treaties that Sweden enters into are drafted with close respect to the OECD Model.
23
 
However, as will be further developed below, some elder treaties deviate from this standard. 
2.2 The Sweden-Peru double tax treaty 
 
The tax treaty relevant in the case of HFD 2012 ref. 20 was signed in 1966 and incorporated 
into Swedish law in 1969.
24
 Contrary to modern day treaties that Sweden enters into, the 1969 
Peru- treaty did not follow the OECD MTC and did not, in its preamble, refer to one of the 
purposes being prevention of fiscal evasion, which is more or less standard in more modern 
treaties.
25
 Also, the treaty provided for reduction of double taxation by use of the exemption 
method which is now days very rarely used in Swedish treaties.
26
 By cause of the exemption 
method, in a situation covered by the Sweden-Peru treaty where Peru would be ascribed the 
right to tax, Sweden would refrain from all taxing claims. The treaty with Peru was 
subsequently terminated in 2007 as a result of increased awareness on that it had been, and 
could be, used by tax payers in order to circumvent Swedish tax legislation.
27
 
                                                          
20
 RÅ 1996 ref. 84 as lifted by Hilling, M. ’HFD:s Peru-domar’ Skattenytt, 2012 P. 585. 
21 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna: 23 May 1969, entered into force on 27 January 1980.  
22
 RÅ 1996 ref. 84. 
23
 Hiort af Ornäs, L. Skatterätt, Egypt: Liber, 2011, P.189. 
24
 SFS 1968:745. 
25
 SFS 1968:745. 
26
 SFS 1968:745, Art. 23A . Hilling, M., ’HFD:s Peru-domar’, Skattenytt, 2012, P. 258. 
27 Skatteutskottets betänkande, 2005/06:SkU37. 
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2.3 The Swedish GAAR 
 
The Swedish law on tax avoidance 
28
 was first adopted in 1980.
29
 Before as well as after its 
appearance in Swedish legislation it has been surrounded by much controversy which even 
led to it being abolished for a period between 1993 and 1995.
30
 The law is still subject of 
intense debate and condemned by many as inefficient, contrary to the rule of law or simply 
unnecessary.
31
 Yet, these are not conclusive or uniform standpoints. The GAAR would by its 
general provision, paragraph 2, provide that a legal act is to be disregarded if: 
1.) The legal act, by itself or in conjunction with other legal acts, is part of proceedings which 
bring substantial benefits to the tax payer.
32
 
2.) The tax payer has directly or indirectly contributed to the undertaken proceedings.
33
 
3.) By respect to the context, the achieved tax advantage can be assumed to constitute the 
predominant motive behind the proceedings.
34
 
4.) Assessment on the basis of the proceedings would be contrary to the purpose of the 
legislation.
35
 
Requisite number four, providing that the transaction must be contrary to the purpose of the 
law, has proven to be the most difficult to interpret. The problematic area of assessing the 
intentions of the legislator is commonly referred to as an impediment to this provision.
36
 
Nevertheless, application of the GAAR has been in question in a number of court cases prior 
to the referred judgment of HFD 2012 ref. 20 as will be seen below.
 37
 
 
                                                          
28
 SFS 1995:575. 
29
 Rosander, U., in IFA bransch report, Congress 56:2002: Oslo, Form and substance in tax law, Cahiers de Droit 
Fiscale, The Hague: Kluwer law international, 2002, P. 531. 
30
 Rosander, U. ’Generalklausul mot skatteflykt’, JIBS Dissertation Series, No. 040, P.93. Prop. 1992/93:127, 
1992/93: SkU14. 
31
 Rosander, U., in IFA bransch report, Congress 56:2002: Oslo, Form and substance in tax law, Cahiers de Droit 
Fiscale, The Hague: Kluwer law international, 2002, P. 531. 
32
 The author’s own translation of Lag 1995:575 om Skatteflykt, Para. 2 p. 1. 
33
 Ibid. Para. 2, p.2. 
34
 Ibid. Para. 2, p.3. 
35
 Ibid. Para. 2, p.4. 
36
 Rosander, U., in IFA bransch report, Congress 56:2002: Oslo, Form and substance in tax law, Cahiers de Droit 
Fiscale, The Hague: Kluwer law international, 2002, P.532. 
37
 See for example RÅ 2004 not. 59. The Swedish Court of Appeal in Jönköping, Case no. 3855-09, 3856-09, 
3857-09, 3858-09, 3863-09. 
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2.4 Events leading up to HFD 2012 ref. 20 
 
Even though the observation made in HFD 2012 ref. 20 will be the sole subject for analysis in 
the present paper it is of interest to shortly comment on some landmarks constituting the 
background of the case. This would be due to the fact that the process and judgments 
delivered by the Courts of Appeal leading up to HFD 2012 ref. 20, have implications for 
conclusions to be drawn on the legal relevance of the observation made obiter dictum. 
In 2004, the Swedish Supreme Administrative Court delivered a judgment concerning 
Peruvian liquidation payments to Swedish tax residents. The liquidated company had carried 
out all of its business activities in Peru. The Court interpreted the treaty with Peru as 
restricting Swedish taxing claims on the relevant income and did also establish that the 
subject to tax rule did not apply to the scenario.
38
 Consequently, the income became subject to 
double exemption as Peru did not impose any tax. 
39
 The judgment became the inspiration and 
point of departure for a long series of cases concerning so called “Peru-schemes” where 
shares in closely held companies were transferred to Peru and became subject to very low, or 
no taxation by means of the Sweden-Peru DTT alongside Swedish tax law providing for tax 
exemption on capital gains on business related shares.
40
 As a consequence, a large number of 
cases concerning the possibility of applying the Swedish GAAR to Peru-schemes have lain 
before the Swedish Administrative Courts and Courts of Appeal during the past few years. 
In 2011, the Swedish Court of Appeal in Jönköping, concluded that the Swedish law on tax 
avoidance could be called upon in order to deny treaty benefits provided for by the Sweden-
Peru treaty as all requisites of the GAAR were considered to be fulfilled.
41
 Meanwhile, in 
another range of cases, the Court of Appeal of Stockholm found the law on tax avoidance as 
not applicable.
42
 This conclusion was based on the opinion that taxation by reference to the 
Sweden-Peru treaty would not be contrary to the law otherwise applied and, additionally, it 
could not be established whether the mutual expectations of the parties provided for 
prevention of abusive applications of the treaty.
43
 Thus, the legal situation was rather unclear 
after the verdicts of the Courts of Appeal of Jönköping and Stockholm had been delivered. 
                                                          
38
 RÅ 2004, not. 59. 
39
 Hilling, M. ’HFD:s Peru-domar’, Skattenytt 2012, P. 586. 
40
 Chapter 24, para. 17, SITA. 
41
 Court of Appeal, Jönköping, Case no. 3855-09, 3856-09, 3857-09, 3858-09, 3863-09.  
42
 Court of Appeal, Stockholm, Case no. 3348-10 and 3349-10. 
43
 Ibid. Case no. 3348-10 and 3349-10. 
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Two of the cases decided in Stockholm got leave to appeal to the Supreme Administrative 
Court, which became HFD 2012 ref. 20. 
2.5 HFD 2012 ref. 20 
2.5.1 Facts 
The judgment, delivered by the Swedish Supreme Administrative Court on the 26
th
 of March 
2012, concerned two identical cases relating to the tax treatment of liquidation payment from 
a company registered in Peru to a tax payer holding full tax liability in Sweden. The tax payer 
(K.P) and his son owned half of the shares of a real estate company (K. and M. P. Fastigheter 
AB) deriving their profits from sale of real estate in Sweden. On the 4
th
 of April 2006 K.P 
bought half of the shares in the Peruvian company Inversiones Kappa Holding SAC (Kappa) 
for a consideration of approximately 1 200 SEK. On the 14
th
 of June 2006 he also bought half 
of the shares in the Swedish companies K. and MP Holding AB (Holding) and Goldcup D 
1261 AB (Management). One day later, on the 15
th
 of June 2006, K.P sold his shares in 
Holding to Kappa for 50 000 SEK and his shares in Real Estate to Management for 612 000 
SEK. Later that month, Management sold these shares on to Holding for the exact same 
amount, 612 000 SEK. In connection to this, K.P. acquired half of the shares of another 
company, Goldcup J AB 1746 (Consulting). Further, on the 28th of June, Consulting bought 
all shares in Holding from Kappa for an amount of 40,5 million SEK, which was equal to the 
substantial value of Holding. In September 2006 Kappa was liquidated and K.P‟s share, 
amounting to half of Kappa‟s security on the purchasing price, was distributed to him. What 
now became the issue, which is the real concern of the case, was whether the payment due to 
the liquidation of Kappa would result in any tax consequences for K.P in Sweden. It should 
here be mentioned that taxation in Peru would be imposed to a rate of 4 % as compared to 30-
60 % under Swedish tax law.
44
 
The tax authorities‟ position on the matter was that Swedish taxing rights were indeed 
restricted by the Sweden-Peru treaty. Yet, they argued, the Swedish GAAR was applicable to 
the scenario. K.P opposed by arguing that domestic rules cannot apply to income already 
exempt from Swedish taxation by the provisions of a treaty.
45
  
 
                                                          
44
 HFD 2012 ref. 20 
45
 Ibid. 
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2.5.2 The Court decision 
 
The Supreme Administrative Court initiated its reasoning by firmly proclaiming that the 
Swedish GAAR provide no exemption for actions covered by double tax treaties and, equally, 
nowhere in the Sweden-Peru DTT is there a provision that would prevent the application of 
domestic anti-avoidance rules. Further, the Court found nothing implying that the mutual 
expectations of the parties had been that domestic anti-avoidance legislation should not be 
applicable to transactions constituting abuse of the treaty. Accordingly, the Court concluded 
that the present case could for certain be tested against the provisions of the Swedish GAAR. 
However, application of the anti-avoidance law requires that assessment on the basis of the 
action would be in violation of the purpose of the legislation.46 By legislation is meant both 
the part that has been applied and the part which has been circumvented, which was what 
became subject of assessment next.
47
 It could be established that Swedish taxing claims 
existed through Chapter 44 of the Swedish Income Tax Act (SITA). As a second step, 
following ordinary treaty interpretation, it was established that the treaty‟s article X covered 
the income at hand. By its provisions, taxation should be ascribed to the jurisdiction where the 
relevant asset was located at the time for realization. Here, the Court evaluated a number of 
aspects and concluded that the factors tying the shares in Kappa to Sweden were primarily the 
Swedish citizenship of the tax payer along with the value of the shares, solely deriving from 
income earned in Sweden on Swedish real estate. Another decisive factor, which is the reason 
for the deviating results in the present case and the earlier case of RÅ 2004 not. 59, was that 
the Peruvian company in HFD 2012 ref. 20 did not carry out any business activity in Peru. 
Thus, to conclude, as the shares in the liquidated Peruvian company were attributable to 
Sweden, taxation was deemed to be imposed under Chapter 44, section 8 of the Swedish 
Income Tax Act. No further comments on the statement made obiter dictum were thereby 
made.
48 
2.6 The obiter dicta – an expression of the law as it stands today? 
 
Opinions on the legal relevance of observations made obiter dictum are, in general, not 
wholly unambiguous. Some commentators would hold them as unnecessary parts of 
                                                          
46
 SFS 1995:575, Para. 2:4 as translated by Rosander, U., in IFA bransch report, Congress 56:2002: Oslo, Form 
and substance in tax law, Cahiers de Droit Fiscale, The Hague: Kluwer law international, 2002, P.531. 
47
 Rosander, U. in Ibid. P. 531. 
48
 HFD 2012 ref. 20. 
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judgments as they are not legally binding and, thereby, generally tend to create more 
confusion than clarity.
49
 However, it has been convincingly argued that circumstances in 
relation to the particular judgment of HFD 2012 ref. 20 result in a stronger legal value than 
what generally can be ascribed to an observation made obiter dictum.
 50
  Peter Meltz argues 
that the relevance of observations obiter dictum depend heavily on the specific context in 
which they are articulated.
51
 It should here be noted that the opinion of the Court regarding 
applicability of the Swedish GAAR is utterly clearly expressed. Secondly, on the very same 
day as the judgment in HFD 2012 ref. 20 was conveyed, the five above mentioned cases 
decided by the Court of Appeal of Jönköping were denied leave to appeal to the Supreme 
Administrative Court. In all of those cases the Court had denied treaty access by reference to 
the domestic GAAR. Scholars such as Maria Hilling see the firm expression of the Court‟s 
standpoint in combination with the denial of leave to appeal as a strong indication on that the 
Court conceive of the results reached by the Jönköping Court as representative for the law as 
it stands today.
52
  To that, Peter Meltz would add that observations made by the Supreme 
Courts must be seen as resembling a persistent perception of the law, even though made obiter 
dictum.
53
 Thus, the observation made in HFD 2012 ref. 20 will hereinafter be treated as 
reflecting the current legal situation in Sweden. 
2.7 Points of interest and concern 
 
After taking part of the Court‟s observation in the above referred judgment, a few points of 
concern arise as possibly being of particular interest regarding their implications in an existing 
international doctrinal framework.  
1. Domestic GAARs are applicable to DTCs 
First, the Court clearly interprets the absence of indications opposing the use of domestic anti-
avoidance rules as justification for applying such rules. However, the Court express little 
clarification on what grounds such justification derives. Should the Court‟s conclusion be 
understood as implying that treaties automatically are to be be interpreted as restricting their 
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abuse? Would application of domestic anti-avoidance rules, thereby, not have to be literally 
endorsed in treaties?  
2. When are domestic anti-avoidance rules applicable to DTCs? 
The Court concludes that Swedish domestic anti-avoidance rules should be applicable to 
scenarios constituting abuse of a treaty. Yet, no guiding provisions on the required contents 
and elements of treaty-abuse can be derived from the statement. Thus, no discussion on who 
is to decide on the contents of abuse are visible. Should identification of abusive practices be 
perceived as a unilateral concern? 
3. What about internationally established general principles of treaty law? 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that treaty provisions must be 
observed. Further, treaty law is commonly perceived of as superior to domestic law.
54
  
However, the Swedish Supreme Administrative Court seems to suggest that the Swedish 
GAAR would prevail over treaty provisions in case of abuse, irrespective of international 
principles or standards. A question that arises hereinto is whether the completion of such 
approach would automatically be in breach of international customary law. 
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3. INTERNATIONAL DOCTRINAL DEBATE  
 
The queries terminating the previous chapter will now, one by one, form the point of 
departure when reviewing international doctrinal debate dedicated to their respective area of 
concern. 
3.1 Application of domestic anti-avoidance rules without expressed 
authorization in treaties 
 
3.1.1 A general international principle of anti-abuse for the purposes of treaty law? 
The Swedish Supreme Administrative Court clearly express that the scenario in HFD 2012 
ref. 20 meet no obstruction of being tested against domestic anti-avoidance legislation.
55
 Less 
clear, however, is on what grounds such firmly expressed standpoint is derived. The Court 
holds the absence of any provisions or indications speaking for the contrary as sufficient 
justification for their conclusion. An adequate point of departure for analysis might therefore 
be the doctrinal discussion on the possible existence of a general, unwritten principle of 
international treaty law implying that treaties do, by means of their inherent purpose, not 
apply to abusive applications. If such general principle exists, many scholars draw the 
conclusion that there would be little need for expressed anti-avoidance provisions in tax 
treaties.
56
 This would, thus, be in accordance with the HFD approach. However, as one might 
expect, great doctrinal controversy surrounds the appropriateness of such approach.  
Before 2003, paragraph 7 of the commentary to Art. 1 of the OECD Model Tax Convention 
would recognize the risk of tax payers using tax treaties in order to exploit differences in 
Member States‟ diverging tax systems and thereby place themselves in more advantageous 
tax positions.
57
 However, the commentary did quite clearly suggest that the right of 
countering undesirable use of tax treaties by means of domestic anti-avoidance rules must be 
literally preserved in treaties by Member States wishing to do so.
58
 In 2003 the revised 
commentary, extensively re-worked as regards clarification on the relationship between 
domestic anti avoidance rules and tax treaties, provided that one of the purposes of tax treaties 
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is to prevent tax avoidance.
59
 Treaties should therefore not be interpreted as to prevent 
application of domestic anti avoidance rules but rather as to prevent treaty abuse.
60
 The effect 
of these changes and clarifications has, according to some authors, “shifted the onus” 61 of 
preserving rights in treaties. It would now be up to those member states not agreeing with the 
“new purpose” of tax treaties to enter observations on the matter and insert provisions into 
their treaties precluding use of domestic anti avoidance rules.
62
 Brian J. Arnold recognizes 
that a contracting state that has entered observations on the Commentary is not bound to 
interpret treaties as to prevent tax avoidance. Such state would be totally free to interpret their 
treaties as precluding application of their own domestic anti-avoidance legislation. However, 
if no provisions of preclusion are inserted in the treaty, the other contracting state would not 
be bound to interpret the treaty as prohibiting application of their anti-avoidance rules. Thus, 
due to the contents of the current commentary, which according to Arnold is to be seen as the 
majority standpoint, it would be legitimate to apply domestic anti-avoidance rules if no 
reservation to the contrary is made in the treaty.
63
  Scholars such as Stef van Weeghel, on the 
other hand, would not subscribe to Arnold‟s conclusion. According to him, it is utterly clear 
that if one country has filed an observation on the commentary, the shared expectations of the 
parties - which the treaty is supposed to reflect - cannot possibly be that each country is free 
to apply their respective anti-avoidance rules. This would be the case even if no reservation is 
made in the treaty. The only thing that can be concluded in such scenario is that the 
contracting states disagree. It would therefore contradict established principles of treaty 
interpretation to allow one of the states to apply their anti-avoidance rules.
64
 The same thing, 
would, according to Mattias Dahlberg, be the case in circumstances encompassing non-OECD 
member states. These countries cannot be expected to share the opinions expressed in the 
commentary and, thus, it is not possible to know the shared intentions of the parties without 
clear provisions in the actual treaties. Therefore, if domestic anti-avoidance rules are to be 
applied, affirmation must be derived from clear provisions in the treaty text.
65
  Van Weeghel 
would, further, on a general basis question the “new purpose” of tax treaties as provided by 
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the 2003 revised Commentary to the OECD MTC. He even reaches as far as asking for a 
recession to the rhetoric of the pre- 2003 commentary, which provides that the purpose of tax 
treaties is, among others, “not to help tax avoidance”.66 This would be due to the fact that in 
the absence of a tax treaty, domestic anti-avoidance rules would apply without hindrance in 
order to counter tax avoidance. That is, within the general limits of domestic law, 
international law and possibly EC law where relevant. Seen that way, the only potential effect 
of tax treaties is to restrict application of domestic anti-avoidance rules. It is therefore, 
according to Van Weeghel, certainly not obvious that the purpose of tax treaties is to prevent 
tax avoidance.
67
 Michael Lang would also support the previous conclusion in terms of the 
need of incorporating direct provisions of delimitations of treaty access in the actual treaties 
instead of relying on general principles of abuse or referring to domestic rules. Lang primarily 
points towards the fact that treaties are not only contracts that operate on a governmental level 
but do also affect citizens and businesses. Denying treaty benefits on the basis of rules that are 
not incorporated into the treaty would not be fair to citizens who derive their rights and 
obligations directly from treaty provisions.
68
  
Yet, even in the absence of the 2003 commentary, it has been suggested that an internationally 
recognized, unwritten principle of abuse of rights may very well exist. Ian Brownlie has 
observed the fact that several systems of law recognize a doctrine of abuse of rights. 
However, he holds, such doctrine is not existent in terms of positive law but rather, serves as 
an agent in the development of the law.
69
 Professor Philip West would hold it as unsettled 
whether a general rule of public international law confines treaty abuse. Even though the 
doctrine of abuse, as pointed out by Brownlie, is not part of positive law in a treaty context, 
West holds it as reasonable to interpret treaties in a manner that is consistent with their 
purpose.
70
 Such purpose would, further, surely be to restrict double taxation but not to 
eliminate taxation or promote tax avoidance. The possibility of interpreting treaties as to 
prevent abuse must, thus, be possible even though no specific provision of anti-abuse exists 
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“within the four corners of the treaty”.71  Therefore, it is the opinion of West, that public 
international law must recognize the existence of a general anti-abuse doctrine for treaty law 
purposes.
72
  
3.1.2 Comments with regard to HFD 2012 ref. 20 
 
The Sweden-Peru double tax convention at issue in the referred case of HFD 2012 ref.20 is 
silent on the relationship between its provisions and domestic anti-avoidance legislation. 
Based on the above, scholars such as West would suggest that irrespective of the provisions of 
the 2003 commentary, treaties must be interpreted as to deny access to abusive applications. If 
the standpoint of Arnold is to be ascribed, the same result would derive from a shifted onus of 
inserting reservations of application of domestic anti-avoidance rules by cause of the 2003 
commentary. Consequently, if no reservations are to be found it can, according to certain 
scholars, be assumed that domestic anti-avoidance rules are not precluded by treaties. An 
immediate reaction here is of course that Peru is not now, nor has ever been, a member of the 
OECD. Even though non OECD member states are allowed to enter observations on the 
commentary, Peru has not done so. According to one of Dahlberg‟s main arguments, this 
would mean that it is impossible to know Peru‟s expectations on the purpose of the treaty 
without outright provisions therein. Another concern evident in the present case is that the 
Sweden- Peru DTT was signed in 1966, almost 40 years prior to the launch of the 2003 
commentary.
73
 Additionally, provisions of the Sweden-Peru DTT deviated significantly from 
the OECD Model. It might therefore be legitimate to conclude that the OECD Model and its 
commentary lack legal relevance in the present scenario. This conclusion is, however, not 
only derived from the facts just mentioned. Even though the reasoning of the Swedish 
Supreme Administrative Court might imply recognition of a general principle of treaty law 
providing that domestic anti-avoidance rules are applicable to treaty provisions it is 
questionable whether the Court builds its opinion upon the commentary, nor any other general 
international principle of treaty law. Maria Hilling points to the fact that no references to the 
commentary or any other ground for justification are made in the judgment. As seen from 
earlier Supreme Administrative Court case law presented above, this is a pronounce deviation 
from usual practice. A deviation that might indicate that the Court base their opinion 
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elsewhere, or more particularly, in a general approach equating treaty law and domestic law.
74
 
Many countries with a dualistic system take the position that treaty law is an incorporated part 
of domestic law for which domestic anti-avoidance legislation applies to restrict treaty 
provisions just as for other domestic tax legislation. The only relevant issue for those 
countries is, therefore, whether provisions of the relevant tax treaty restrict application of 
domestic rules.
75 If this is the approach mediated by the Supreme Administrative Court, 
consequently, the existence or non existence of a general internationally recognized principle 
of prohibition of abuse for treaty law purposes is irrelevant. Equally irrelevant is whether Peru 
is a member of the OECD. 
To conclude, the Court does undeniably proclaim that domestic anti-avoidance legislation is 
applicable to situations governed by tax treaties if no provisions or indications to the contrary 
are to be found. In so doing, they do not share the common, yet not conclusive, doctrinal 
standpoint that application of domestic anti-avoidance legislation should be anchored in 
articulate treaty provisions. Even though the Court‟s standpoint bears clear resemblance to the 
contents of the 2003 commentary to the OECD MTC, the standpoint is more probably an 
expression of an approach equating international law with domestic law. Thus, assessment of 
improper use of tax treaties will be carried out purely by reference to the domestic definition 
of tax avoidance. Accordingly, in the present scenario, it looks as if only Swedish requisites 
for abusive practices will be observed. A concern that arises hereinto is, consequently, 
whether the current scenario can be seen as a purely domestic matter. Hilling has suggested 
that taxation by reference to the Swedish GAAR would, even though only Swedish tax law is 
being circumvented, mean a denial of treaty protection. A relevant question is therefore, 
whether the present scenario and assessment of possible abuse can be said to be purely a 
Swedish domestic concern.
76
 This will be assessed next. 
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3.2 When is a tax treaty being abused?  
3.2.1 A one-state concern?  
 
It can be worth replicating that the HFD conclusion in the referred case is that domestic anti-
avoidance rules are applicable to transactions constituting abuse of a treaty.
77
 However, the 
Court does not make clear on what grounds they see the current scenario as possibly abusive 
and, thus, what elements should be present for a transaction to be tested against the GAAR. 
Attempts of characterizing abuse and drawing conclusions on common and general features of 
such practices have been frequently made by both scholars and courts.
78
 With regard to these 
attempts, generally, it has been held that abusive practices can be identified by a combination 
of subjective assessment of the intentions of the tax payer and an objective analysis of the 
purpose of the relevant legislation.
79
 A definition containing these cumulative elements can be 
found in Paragraph 9.5 of the Commentary to Art. 1 of the OECD MTC.
80
 The paragraph 
suggests that domestic anti-avoidance rules should apply only if first, the main reason behind 
entering into a transaction or arrangement is to achieve a more favorable tax position, and 
second, obtaining this more favorable position is contrary to the object and purpose of the 
relevant provisions of the treaty.
81
 Jacques Sasseville and Brian J. Arnold point to the 
important function of Paragraph 9.5 which, according to them, serves as a balance between 
the need to prevent treaty abuse with the need to encourage countries to take serious on, and 
follow, treaty commitments.
82
 Arnold articulates the need for such effect by stating that “[a] 
country should not be able to avoid its treaty obligations taking the position that virtually all 
transactions are abusive and all of its domestic tax rules are anti-avoidance rules”.83 To some 
authors, the elements provided by Paragraph 9.5 of the Commentary appear to correspond to a 
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general international law doctrine of abuse of rights, thus relevant on a general international 
basis.
84
 However, not all scholars would agree on such conclusion. 
Van Weeghel finds it peculiar that the definition provided above only requires tax avoidance 
to constitute one of the purposes of a transaction. As tax planning is lawful behavior and 
taxpayers are not forced to arrange business in a way that attracts a maximum tax burden, Van 
Weeghel instead suggests that in identifying improper or abusive use of tax treaties, guidance 
should be found by evaluating whether tax avoidance is the sole reason for arrangements. A 
second proxy would then be whether the application of a treaty to such arrangement would 
defeat fundamental and enduring expectations and policy objectives shared by both 
contracting states.
85
 Michael Lang, on the other hand, finds the act of defining abusive 
applications of double tax conventions being a very troublesome area altogether. Like Van 
Weeghel, Lang recognizes that enterprises all over the world face an enduring obligation of 
arranging affairs in an as cost effective manner as possible. As long as double tax treaties 
permit different rates of tax at source enterprises are in effect, according to Lang, more or less 
forced to set up companies in countries having the most favorable DTTs.
86
 Therefore, Lang 
sees the motive of the tax payer as highly irrelevant in establishing the existence of abuse of 
treaty provisions. This is a view seemingly supported also by the 2008 UN report on improper 
use of tax treaties which in paragraph 27 states that abuse is to be assessed on the basis of 
objective fact finding and not the intention of the tax payer.
87
 Lang would further state that the 
act of standardizing or defining abuse is dangerous and might even risk contradicting the rule 
of law. Instead, the guiding principle on whether a treaty is being abused or not should be 
derived from whether the purpose of the treaty has been met. If the purpose of the treaty is 
met, then there should be no way of denying its benefits to tax payers. The primary purpose of 
DTTs are further, according to Lang, elimination of double taxation. The question of applying 
domestic anti abuse rules would then never have to be actualized as treaties do, automatically, 
not apply to arrangements failing to meet their purpose.
88
 Lalithkumar Rao would agree on 
the conclusion of Lang in respect of meeting the purpose of the treaty is the only relevant 
concern when assessing treaty abuse. In so doing, he suggests that guidance should be derived 
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from whether transactions carry any real economic substance.
89
 This line of reasoning is 
representative for a view placing a clear separation line between domestic and international 
legislation. According to such approach, treaty benefits can be denied only by reference to the 
actual treaty and the shared expectations of the parties. This would be due to, as Lang puts it, 
if interpretation of the provisions of a treaty was carried out according to each contracting 
state‟s domestic anti-abuse rules, the result would be two different interpretations of the treaty 
as anti-abuse rules differ from country to country. Such result would be contrary to the 
purpose of tax treaties.
90
  
Similarly, Franz Wassermeyer holds that, in the absence of any clear provisions on what 
would constitute abuse of treaties, reliance can be put on different reservations of abuse from 
country to country and the delimitation of such reservation would thereby not be clear on a 
general or mutual basis.
91
 This result would be the consequence of, as also highlighted by 
Lang, member states defining abusive practices differently and might also target differing 
elements of such practices. These are difficulties that, according to Wassermeyer, easily can 
be limited if the shared perception of the contracting parties‟ view on the minimum content of 
abuse was put directly in treaties.
92
 Another of his considerations relates to the fact that, if 
abuse is to be conceived of as the circumvention of a certain tax treatment in a certain 
jurisdiction by use of a DTT, only one of the contracting states, namely the one whose tax law 
is being circumvented, would be the suffering part. Thereby, only one of the contracting states 
in most scenarios has reason to observe that arrangements might be abusive. Also here would 
express provisions regarding the minimum content of abuse be preferable.
93
  
It is an established fact that states define and assess abusive practices in widely differing 
manners.
94
 Yet, it is not doctrinally settled whether the differing thresholds of abusive 
practices necessarily constitute an impediment to the possibility of interpreting tax treaties by 
reference to domestic anti-avoidance legislation. Philip West suggests that if domestic anti-
avoidance rules were not accepted as tools of interpretation in a treaty law context, it would 
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result in an unbearable situation where domestic law that is normally applicable when 
interpreting a statute imposing a tax is suddenly not applicable in a treaty governed context.
95
 
This is a view bearing clear resemblance to earlier expressed standpoints made by Stanley 
Katz, concluding that treaties do, by their very nature, operate through domestic law.
96
 
Therefore, it is necessary for domestic law to remain coherent, which includes that domestic 
anti-avoidance rules must be applicable also to treaty provisions.
97
 Lang would, however, 
probably counter such argumentation by stating that the nature of tax treaties is to set out 
premises for when domestic rights to tax are restricted. Such function cannot be maintained 
when interpreting treaties in the light of domestic anti-abuse rules. Thus, irrespective of anti-
avoidance legislation, treaty protection should still be present.
98
  
3.2.2 Comments with regard to HFD 2012 ref. 20 
 
In essence, there seems to be mainly two approaches regarding the assessment of abuse of 
double tax treaties. The first one implying that treaty law and domestic law are two separate 
legal systems that should be kept apart. Therefore, abuse would only be assessable by 
reference to the purpose of the treaty itself and not as a consequence of interpretation through 
domestic law. The opposite standpoint would be advocating a view on treaty law as an 
inherent part of domestic legislation for which domestic anti avoidance rules can serve as 
canons of interpretation in the consideration of treaty abuse. 
Once again, even though the commentary to the OECD MTC would have provided support 
for the conclusion of the Swedish Supreme Administrative Court, this time by Paragraph 9.5, 
no discussion takes place on either the commentary or the existence of a general principle of 
the substance and contents of abusive practices. Even though there is ground for arguing that 
the commentary is of small legal value in the current context it has, as seen above, been 
suggested that the provisions of Paragraph 9.5 represent a general and guiding principle on 
when treaties are being abused.
99
 Since the Court dedicates no discussion on the contents and 
elements required for testing a scenario against the domestic law on tax avoidance it can 
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merely be concluded that not only testing, but also identifying possible treaty abuse is seen as 
a purely domestic concern and does not have to be justified by reference to international law. 
By applying domestic anti-avoidance rules in order to deny treaty benefits the existence of 
abuse is assessed through purely domestic proxies and it is, as many scholars point out, not 
certain that the other contracting state would share the same notion of abuse. That said, would 
the apprehension of Brian J. Arnold be justified? Could Sweden argue that just any 
transaction constitutes treaty abuse and claim any domestic law provision to be an anti-
avoidance rule?  
It should be noted that Wassermeyer holds only one of the contracting states as the suffering 
part in a situation of circumvention of domestic legislation. Regarding the argumentation of 
Lang, however, this might be only a partly correct observation. Application of domestic anti 
avoidance rules may result in denial of treaty benefits on the basis of a notion of abuse not 
necessarily shared by the other contracting state. If the other contracting state doesn‟t perceive 
the situation as abusive, can the function and protection of the treaty still be considered as 
maintained? In other words, the handling of abuse might not just be a question of 
circumvention of one country‟s domestic law but also a question of ensuring treaty protection, 
which is presumably a question of interest for both contracting states. The referred HFD 
judgment does not reveal any consideration of such concern. What can be concluded so far is 
that the Court‟s observation in HFD 2012 ref. 20 has, directly and indirectly, answered 
questions of whether and when the Swedish GAAR is applicable to income governed by a tax 
treaty. A scenario can be tested against the law on tax avoidance in situations constituting 
abuse of the treaty. A treaty should further be considered to be abused when domestic 
requisites are fulfilled.  
3.3 Compatibility with internationally established principles and customary 
international law 
 
Even though the Court‟s position on the applicability of the Swedish GAAR to prevent treaty 
abuse is utterly clearly expressed in HFD 2012 ref.20, it must be remembered that the Court 
never went further than establishing a possibility. Albeit, as the GAAR was never applied it is 
not utterly clear whether domestic anti-avoidance rules automatically would prevail over 
treaty provisions as soon as the requisites of the law are fulfilled. Treaties are generally 
recognized as superior to domestic legislation and scholars commonly hold the principle of 
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pacta sunt servanda as constituting the essence of customary international law.
100
 However, as 
has been concluded above, the Court does not seem to be explicitly concerned with 
international standards or principles in the particular case of HFD 2012 ref. 20. A question 
arising hereinto is, therefore, whether the completion of the Court‟s standpoint, as expressed 
obiter dictum, inevitably would lead to tax treaty override and, consequently, be in breach 
with customary international law. This is what will be discussed next. 
3.3.1 Conflicting rules 
 
A pre dominant, however not conclusive, view in international doctrine is that tax treaty law 
constitutes special legislation in relation to domestic law and should therefore prevail in a 
conflict situation due to the general legal principle of “lex specialis derogat legi generali” 
(special legislation overrides general legislation).
101
 Scholars often hold that the relevance of 
the principles of lex superior and lex specialis is clear already from the enunciation of treaty 
provisions as they regulate the taxing rights of a specific country in a specific situation on a 
specific income.
102
 Other authors express this same idea by stating that tax treaty provisions 
“modify domestic law of the contracting states”.103 However, the relationship between tax 
treaties and domestic law cannot be summed up that easily; merely by stating that treaties 
prevail over domestic law. The status of international law as superior to domestic legislation 
will, according to some commentators, always depend on the legal order in the state dealing 
with conflicting provisions.
104
 In 17 out of 43 European states, treaty law holds the status of 
lex superior by established provisions in the constitution and is an unwritten principle of law 
in at least five more states.
105
  
 
Unlike many other countries, Sweden is not constitutionally bound to prioritize treaties at the 
expense of domestic law. Yet, regarding treaty relations, there are international binding rules 
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to consider, predominantly in terms of Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT).
106
 By those rules countries are enforced to follow their treaties (pacta sunt 
servanda), and to do so in good faith. Further, by the provisions of Art. 27, states may not call 
upon domestic rules as justification for failing to perform a treaty.
107
 However, according to 
scholars such as Anders Hultqvist, a state with a dualistic approach to the relationship 
between treaty law and domestic law may lawfully perceive of such provisions as normative 
rather than legally binding.
108
 Thus, from a strict constitutional outlook, the government is 
free to legislate against provisions of tax treaties and neither government, parliament or any 
other authority may decide upon how the Court is to apply a certain piece of legislation or 
how the Court should rule in the individual case.
109
 On the other hand, there might be strong 
normative incentives not to override treaties. The act of disobeying treaty provisions by 
reference to domestic law is commonly seen as a highly inappropriate behavior that risk 
resulting in termination of the treaty, liability for damages or at least; harmed credibility.
110
  
Mattias Dahlberg has, in addition to what was just said, stressed that the act of applying 
domestic legislation in contradiction to tax treaty provisions does indeed meet severe 
obstruction in the form of customary international law and particularly the principle of pacta 
sunt servanda.
111
 The relevance of such standpoint in the context of HFD 2012 ref. 20 will be 
discussed below. 
3.3.2 Pacta sunt servanda or treaty override? 
 
Connected to the issue of rule conflict and whether application of domestic rules can be 
precluded by conflicting tax treaty provisions is, ultimately, whether application of a domestic 
anti-avoidance rule would constitute treaty override and thereby contradict the general 
internationally recognized principle of pacta sunt servanda. As seen above, Sweden is not 
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constitutionally bound to prioritize treaty provisions in case of conflict with domestic rules.
112
 
However, Jan Wouters and Maarten Vidal would point out that even if treaty overrides are 
constitutionally justified in some states, such practices are most likely unlawful according to 
international law.
 113
 Thus, in contradiction to what has been held by Hultqvist above, 
Wouters and Vidal hold municipal lawfulness as irrelevant in the context of implementation 
of treaty obligations. All countries, even those who are not constitutionally required to follow 
treaties, are bound to apply and interpret their treaties in good faith as provided by Art. 26 
VCLT.
114
 Whether these requirements can be fulfilled when applying domestic anti-avoidance 
legislation in tax treaty relations, or whether such practice would constitute treaty override, is 
what will be examined next. 
According to the OECD report on tax treaty overrides
115
, such term would be defined as 
“Domestic legislation intended by the legislature to have effects in clear contradiction to 
international treaty obligations”.116 International treaty obligations would further be defined 
by the Vienna Convention, predominantly in Article 26 as “[e]very treaty is binding upon the 
parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith”117 The ICJ has interpreted good 
faith as meaning that “it is the purpose of the treaty, and the intentions of the parties in 
concluding it, which should prevail over its literal application”.118 A similar definition can be 
found in Art. 31 VCLT.
119
 Thus, the principle of good faith compels the parties to apply the 
treaty in such way that the purpose of it can be realized.
120
 However, by reference to the 
purpose of treaties, a number of commentators would hold the seriousness ascribed to treaty 
overrides as exaggerated.
121
 A defense for this standpoint is expressed by Reuven S. Avi-
Yonah who states that, if used sparingly and correctly, treaty overrides is an indispensable 
tool in combating tax avoidance and abuse of treaties which, according to him, is coherent to 
the two fold purpose of treaties, encompassing both prevention of double taxation and double 
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non-taxation.
122
 Other scholars similarly build their support for treaty overrides on the 
underlying purpose of tax treaties. Mike MacIntyre would recognize that overrides being in 
substantial breach with international law would undeniably be unjustifiable. However, he 
would not hold all overrides as necessarily constituting such substantial breach.
123
 Both Avi-
Yonah and McIntyre view the purpose of tax treaties as a dual one, prohibiting not only 
double taxation but also double non-taxation. Thus, treaty overrides resulting in prevention of 
both outcomes would be compatible with the requirements of international law.
124
 Also, the 
mentioned OECD report on tax treaty overrides might advocate a similar approach to the 
purpose of DTTs, stating that “Tax treaties aim primarily at the avoidance of double taxation 
and the prevention of fiscal evasion but also have the objective of allocating tax revenues 
equitably between two contracting states. Thus, any interpretation achieving these objectives 
would be preferable to one leading to double taxation or to an inappropriate double non-
taxation.”125  
However, the possibility for states to justify treaty overrides by reference to necessity of 
maintaining equitable allocation of tax revenues would, according to Wouters and Vidal, be 
limited to very restrictive circumstances such as massive tax fraud endangering the continuity 
of public services and other equally serious scenarios.
126
 This opinion is built upon a 
statement made by the ICJ in Gabikovo-Nagymaros, where the Court holds that over rulings 
of treaties by reference to necessity can only be invoked on a very exceptional basis.
127
 
Wouters and Vidal would instead suggest other lawful means available for achieving an 
appropriate result with regard to the abuse of tax treaties. Such lawful means would consist of 
cooperative action and consultation with the other contracting party regarding possible 
amendments to the relevant treaty rather than unilateral action by means of application of 
domestic legislation.
128
 Yet, it has been questioned whether amendments and renegotiations 
would be a reasonable measure to undertake every time a treaty is being abused. Avi-Yonah‟s 
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opinion on the matter  is that tax law and practice change too fast for treaties to be 
renegotiated every time an unintended loophole is discovered and used by taxpayers in order 
to circumvent legislation. Wouters and Vidal, obviously representing a more restrictive view, 
would respond that such argumentation cannot be accepted as changed circumstances do not 
call for unilateral and one sided action, but rather international cooperation in good faith.
129
  
It should here be stressed that commentaries to the VCLT provide that the essence of 
lawfulness in treaty relations, provided for by international law, remain limited to the 
principles of pacta sunt servanda and good faith.
130
 Vaughan Lowe has, in this respect, 
pointed out that the principle of pacta sunt servanda is utterly irrelevant in terms of treaty 
interpretation. No one would oppose the fact that treaties are to be followed. The central 
provision of Art. 26 VCLT is instead in what way the treaty is to be followed, namely, in 
good faith. Similarly, other commentators hold the principle of good faith as constituting the 
very essence of pacta sunt servanda.
131
 International law does in this respect, as seen in both 
Art. 31 VCLT and ICJ case law, not call for literal interpretation of treaty provisions.
132
 In 
this spirit, Vaughan Lowe holds that interpretation of the purpose of a treaty does, in fact, 
require a more flexible and contextual approach. Along this line of reasoning he would 
continue to argue that the question of whether domestic anti-avoidance rules conflict with tax 
treaties cannot be established by reference to the Vienna Convention as such, but only with 
respect to the purpose of the particular treaty at hand.
133
  Thus, domestic anti-avoidance rules 
cannot be seen as principally conflicting with Art. 26 VCLT since the article merely calls for 
interpretation of treaties in good faith. Similarly, Roland Gustafsson would add that an answer 
to what a state is allowed to do in terms of application of domestic anti-avoidance rules in 
treaty contexts will never derive from international provisions of the VCLT, the OECD MTC, 
its commentaries or any other international principles. The answer does, according to him, not 
exist in such provisions. Instead, the principle of good faith brings that settlement of 
applicability of domestic anti avoidance rules will ultimately have to take place between the 
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only actors who can actually settle such question, namely the competent authorities of the 
contracting states.
134
 
3.3.3 Comments with regard to HFD 2012 ref. 20 
 
First, what can be reiterated is that the Supreme Administrative Court does not provide any 
directions on the legal status of Swedish domestic anti-avoidance law in relation to possibly 
conflicting treaty provisions. This might be due to the fact that the judgment was reached 
without such application being actualized. However, a question arising in this context is 
whether the Court perhaps also knowingly refrain from commenting on the relationship 
between domestic law and treaty law or whether this is a result of the Court simply not 
recognizing a possible conflict scenario. From a strict constitutional outlook, which in this 
context would mean that treaty law does not hold the status of lex superior by constitutional 
provisions, it might be so that domestic rules cannot be seen as standing in conflict with treaty 
law as, if needed, treaties can be overruled. However, even if the Court did not recognize a 
possible rule conflict, it might have been appropriate to articulate the reason for such 
standpoint in relation to its observation. In the absence of explanatory comments, it might be 
legitimate to wonder whether the Court‟s standpoint, in fact, is signaling carte blanche to 
treaty overrides.  
It should first be drawn to mind that treaty overrides are generally seen as the application of 
domestic legislation having effects in clear contradiction to international treaty obligations.
135
 
The question is, thus, whether application of the GAAR would stand in clear contradiction to 
international obligations in terms of the provisions of the VCLT. Commentators generally 
seem to hold Art. 26 as constituting the essence of treaty relations and the principle of good 
faith as its main provision. The question of treaty override by application of the Swedish 
GAAR would, thus, ultimately boil down to whether its application would be contrary to the 
purpose of the relevant treaty, which is also supported by the definition of treaty overrides in 
the OECD report. According to scholars such as Avi-Yonah and McIntyre, application of 
domestic anti-avoidance rules cannot be said to be in substantial breach with a DTT if the two 
fold purpose of the treaty is observed. Whether this would be the case in the present scenario 
is difficult to answer. It should be noted that Wouters and Vidal hold treaty overrides as 
                                                          
134
 Gustafsson, R. in IFA Cahiers 1994, Vol. 19 C, How domestic anti-avoidance rules affect double taxation 
conventions, Toronto, Canada, 1994, P. 23-24. 
135
 OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs “Report on Tax Treaty Overrides”, Paris, 1989,P. 30. 
33 
 
justified only in case of massive tax fraud. This, however, seem more of a normative product 
than derived from international law provisions. Further, the Vienna Convention provides only 
general guidance on treaty commitments, which according to the ICJ
136
, confers the task of 
interpretation to the contracting parties. Consequently, the purpose of a treaty would 
ultimately be a reflection of the shared expectations of its contractors. Thus, standpoints such 
as those expressed by Lowe and Gustafsson seem fairly relevant in suggesting that application 
of domestic anti avoidance rules can never, as such, constitute a breach of international law as 
it would be a matter dependent on a treaty to treaty basis. If this is accurately understood it 
would, to some extent, justify the low profile kept by the Court regarding the relationship 
between domestic rules and treaty law. It might be reasonable for the Court not to advocate 
too firm of a standpoint on the correlation between domestic law and treaty law as such 
relationship can vary significantly. However, even if this is the Court‟s standpoint there is still 
little reason for not clarifying the matter in relation to the observations made.  
  
                                                          
136
 ICJ Gabikovo- Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovak Republic), Para.142. 
34 
 
4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The ambition and purpose of this paper was to place the observation made by the Swedish 
Supreme Administrative Court in HFD 2012 ref. 20 into an international framework of 
doctrinal debate. This would be in order to draw internationally relevant conclusions on the 
advantages and disadvantages of the Court‟s standpoint regarding applicability of domestic 
general anti-avoidance rules in relation to tax treaty commitments. First, it might be justified 
to conclude that tax scholars do not agree on a coherent approach on the issue of abuse of tax 
treaties and the applicability of domestic anti-avoidance legislation. A review of the literature 
dedicated to the matter leads to a conclusion that the debate can be said to primarily center 
around two main and overall concerns. Namely, whether abuse of treaty law is primarily a 
domestic- or international concern. These questions seemingly constitute an umbrella to 
which all subsequent reasoning and argumentation is attached. Debate regarding abuse being 
a domestic concern leads on to whether and how domestic legislation applies in relation to 
double tax conventions. The issue of whether abuse is instead a concern of treaty law relates 
to the subsequent question of whether international law recognize a general and uniform 
concept of abuse or whether provisions of anti-abuse need to be explicitly inserted in treaties 
in order to apply.
137
  
Objections and criticism towards applying domestic anti-avoidance legislation in contexts 
governed by tax treaties seem to mainly center on concerns regarding the unilateralism arising 
in situations that should be governed by joint expectations. In applying domestic law 
provisions without expressed authorization from the relevant treaty, observance of the mutual 
expectations may not be guaranteed, as tax treaties cannot be seen as automatically and by 
means of an unwritten rule, serving to prevent tax avoidance. Further, definitions and 
assessment of abusive applications would be made solely by reference to only one state‟s 
requisites for abuse which wouldn‟t necessary correspond to the other contracting state‟s 
notion of the term. If a general and universal principle on the contents of abuse cannot be said 
to exist, consequently, the shared expectations on treaty protection may very well be 
breached. In essence, by standards of international law, the purpose of a treaty must be 
observed at all times. As tax avoidance is a matter without a clear common definition and if 
treaties cannot be said to automatically preclude tax avoidance, critics seem partly right in the 
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opinion that observance of the purpose of a treaty cannot be guaranteed when applying 
domestic anti-avoidance rules.  
On the other hand, the purpose of a treaty is the result of mutual agreement, encompassing 
mutual expectations. Thus, it does not seem possible to determine the purpose of a treaty on a 
general basis. International law does only set out general premises for treaty application and 
interpretation. Yet, whether the purpose of a treaty is being observed or not should reasonably 
only be possible to decide with regard to the particular treaty at hand. In its observation, the 
Swedish Supreme Administrative Court does in fact refer to the mutual expectations of the 
parties. However, it is the absence of indications implying that expectations would oppose the 
application of domestic anti avoidance rules that serve as justification for the Court‟s 
conclusion. Even though such approach can be supported according to some scholars, by 
means of general unwritten understandings, it can definitely also be questioned whether the 
absence of provisions can be interpreted as affirmation. The Court could virtually apply any 
rule by mans of such reasoning. Thus, in order to show concern for treaty protection and the 
expectations of the other contracting state it seems to have been appropriate for the Court to 
refer to internationally recognized standards, such as the commentary to the OECD MTC and 
the Vienna Convention. Even though the commentary lack legal relevance in the current 
scenario per se, it could have been argued that its‟ provisions represent a general international 
approach of treaty law.  
Thus, with regard to international doctrine, the main problem of the Swedish Supreme 
Administrative Court‟s observation seems to be the inability of the Court to justify their 
approach in an internationally viable way as they choose to see the issue of tax avoidance and 
treaty abuse as a purely domestic concern. Such approach might risk leading to inadvertence 
of the other contracting party‟s expectations on the treaty and thereby also an inadvertence of 
the fundamental treaty protection which, unarguably, is the essential reason for entering into 
treaty relations in the first place. However, as every treaty is subject to interpretation by the 
contracting states, it cannot be established that a treaty would infallibly be breached by 
application of domestic anti-avoidance rules, just as it cannot be concluded that anti-
avoidance rules would necessarily be in line with the purpose of treaties. Thus, an 
unequivocal and internationally valid answer to the question of applicability of domestic anti-
avoidance rules to scenarios governed by tax treaties seems impossible to find, presumably 
because there is none. 
36 
 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Sources of law 
 
 The GAAR: SFS 1995:575, Lag mot skatteflykt, Para. 2. 
SITA: SFS 1999:1229, Inkomstskattelag, Chapter 44, Section 8. 
 Constitutional law: 1974 års Regeringsform, Chapter 11, Para. 2. 
 
Litterature 
 
Arnold, B.J., „Tax treaties and tax avoidance: The 2003 revisions to the commentary to the OECD 
Model‟, Bulletin for International Fiscal Documentation, no.6, 2004, P.244-260. 
Arnold, B.J., „The relationship between tax treaties and domestic anti-abuse measures‟ in Maisto, G. 
(Series Edt.) Tax treaties and domestic law, Vol.2, Amsterdam: IBFD, 2006, P.81-102. 
Avi-Yonah, R.S., „Tax traty overrides: a qualified defence of U.S practice‟ in Maisto, G. (Series Edt.), 
Tax treaties and domestic law,  Amsterdam: IBFD, 2006, P.65-79. 
 
Brownlie, I., Principles of Public International law, Oxford University Press, 2008, P. 444-445. 
 
Dahlberg, M., Internationell beskattning, Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2012, P. 230-258. 
 
Essers, P. in IFA Cahiers 2000 Munich, Vol. 25 B, Abusive application of international tax 
agreements, The Hague: Kluwer law international, 2000, P. 3. 
 
Gregow, T. ‟Några synpunkter på frågan om prejudikats bindande verkan‟, Festskrift till Gösta Walin,  
Stockholm: Nordstedts Juridik, 2002, P. 105. 
 
Grundström, K.J, ‟Treaty override – nu även i Skatterättsnämnden‟, Skattenytt 2010, P.159-
166. 
 
Gustafsson, R. in IFA Cahiers 1994 Toronto, Vol. 19 C, How domestic anti-avoidance rules 
affect double taxation conventions, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1994, P. 23. 
 
Hilling, M., ‟HFDs Perudomar‟, Skattenytt, 2012,P. 582-591. 
 
Hiort af Ornäs, L. Skatterätt, Egypt: Liber, 2011, P.189. 
 
Hultqvist, A. „Metodfrågor vid konflikt mellan lagar om dubbelbeskattningsavtal och andra 
skattebestämmelser – en argumentationsanalys‟, Svensk skattetidning, 2010, P. 520-534. 
 
37 
 
Katz , S. in IFA Cahiers 1994 Toronto, Vol. 19 C, How domestic anti-avoidance rules affect 
double taxation conventions, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1994, P. 9-10. 
 
Lang, M., in IFA Cahiers 2000 Munich, Vol. 25 B, Abusive application of international tax 
agreements, The Hague: Kluwer law international, 2000, P.6-8, 16-17. 
 
Lindencrona, G, Dubbelbeskattningsavtalsrätt, Stockholm: Juristförlaget, 1994, P. 20-24. 
 
Lodin, S.O, Lindencrona, G., Meltz, P., Silfverberg, C., Simon-Almendal T. Inkomstskatt- En läro- 
och handbook I skatterätt, Part 2, Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2011, P. 615. 
 
Lowe, R., in IFA Cahiers 1994 Toronto, Vol. 19 C, How domestic anti-avoidance rules affect 
double taxation conventions, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1994, P.7. 
 
McIntyre, M., „A defence of treaty overrides‟, Tax Notes Int’l, December 1989, P. 611-614. 
 
Meltz, P., ‟Obiter dicta i Regeringsrättens prejudikatsbildning – hjälpsamt eller förvirrande?‟, 
Regeringsrätten 100 år, Uppsala: Iustus Förlag, 2009, P. 345-347. 
 
Mutén, L. „Treaty override i Regeringsrätten‟, Svensk Skattetidning, 2008, P.353. 
 
Peczenik, A., ‟Juridikens allmänna läror‟, Svensk Juristtidning, 2005:3, P. 249 ff. 
 
Pelin, L. Internationell skatterätt i ett Svenskt perspektiv, Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2011, p. 97.  
 
Rao, L. in IFA Cahiers 2000 Munich, Vol. 25 B, Abusive application of international tax agreements, 
The Hague: Kluwer law international, 2000, P. 9. 
 
Rosander, U., in IFA bransch report, Congress 56:2002: Oslo, Form and substance in tax law, Cahiers 
de Droit Fiscale, The Hague: Kluwer law international, 2002, P. 530-532. 
 
Rosander, U. ‟Generalklausul mot skatteflykt‟, JIBS Dissertation Series, No. 040, P.90-94. 
 
Van Weeghel, S., „The relationship between tax treaties and domestic anti-abuse measures‟ in Maisto, 
G. (Series Edt.), Tax treaties and domestic law, Vol. 2, Amsterdam: IBFD, 2006, p. 90. 
 
Salmon, J. in Corten, O. and Klein, P., The Vienna Convention on The Law of Treaties – A 
commentary,  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011p. 671. 
 
Sasseville, J., „A tax treaty perspective‟ in Maisto, G. (Series Edt.), Tax treaties and domestic tax law, 
Vol.2, Amsterdam: IBFD, 2006, P. 37-38, 55-60.  
 
Schaus, A. in Corten, O., & Klein, P., The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties - A 
Commentary, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, P. 700. 
 
Van Weeghel, S., The improper use of tax treaties, Boston: Kluwer law international, 1998, P. 258. 
 
38 
 
Vogel, K.‟The domestic law perspective‟ in Maisto, G. (Series Edt.), Tax treaties and domestic law, 
Vol.2, Amsterdam: IBFD, 2006, P. 3-11. 
 
Von Verdross, A., „Règles generals du droit de la paix‟, RCADI,  1929-V, Vol.30, P. 427 and 443 Via 
Salmon, J. in Corten, O. and Klein, P., The Vienna Convention on The Law of Treaties – A 
commentary, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, P. 671. 
 
Wassermeyer, F., in IFA Cahiers 2000 Munich, Vol. 25 B, Abusive application of international tax 
agreements, The Hague: Kluwer law international, 2000, P. 19-20. 
 
West, P., in IFA Cahiers 2000 Munich, Vol. 25 B, Abusive application of international tax 
agreements, The Hague: Kluwer law international, 2000, P. 5-6, 11-15, 20. 
 
Wouters, J. & Vidal, M.,„ The international perspective‟ in Maisto, G. (Series Edt.), Tax treaties and 
domestic law, Amsterdam: IBFD, 2006,  P.13-35. 
 
Zimmer, R. (Edt.) in IFA Cahiers 56: 2002: Oslo, Form and substance in tax law, The Hague: Kluwer 
law international, 2002, P.61. 
E-books 
 
Lang, M. General report,  Introduction to the law on double taxation conventions, (2010), E-book on 
IBFD Tax Research Platform, retrieved 30/3-2013, Chapter V, part 1 (no page no. visible). 
Treaties 
 
General: The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna: 23 May 1969. Art. 26-27, 31-33. 
Sweden – Peru: SFS 1968:745. 
UN 
 
Report on improper use of tax treaties, 2008, Geneva: UN. 
OECD 
 
OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, report on tax treaty overrides, Paris, 1989. 
Commentary to Art. 1 of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, Condensed 
versions, 1997 and 2010, Paris: OECD. 
Case law 
 
The Swedish Supreme Administrative Court: HFD 2012 ref. 20. 
 
The Swedish Supreme Administrative Court: RÅ 2010 ref. 112. 
39 
 
The Swedish Supreme Administrative Court: RÅ 2008 ref. 24.  
The Swedish Supreme Administrative Court: RÅ 2004 not. 59. 
The Swedish Supreme Administrative Court: RÅ 1996 ref. 84. 
 
Court of Appeal, Stockholm: Case no. 3348-10 and 3349-10. 
 
Court of Appeal, Jönköping: Case no. 3855-09, 3856-09, 3857-09, 3858-09, 3863-09. 
 
The International Court of Justice: Judgment of 25 September 1997, Gabikovo- Nagymaros Project 
(Hungary/Slovak Republic). 
 
The European Court of Justice: ECJ, C-94/05 Emsland-Stärke GmbH v 
Landwirtschaftskammer Hannover.  
The European Court of Justice: ECJ, C-196/02 Cadbury Schweppes plc and Cadbury 
Schweppes Overseas Ltd vCommissioners of Inland Revenue. 
 
Government bills 
Prop. 1992/93:127. 
Tax committee reports 
 
Skatteutskottets betänkande, 2005/06: SkU37. 
Skatteutskottets betänkande, 1992/93: SkU14. 
 
 
 
